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Abstract: Over the past few years, a significant global debate has developed over
the classification of workers in the sharing economy either as independent
contractors or as employees. While Uber and Lyft have dominated the spotlight
lately, the worker classification debates extend beyond ridesharing companies
and affect workers across a variety of sectors. Classification of a worker as an
employee, rather than an independent contractor, can carry a range of implica-
tions for worker treatment and protections under labor law, anti-discrimination
law, tort law, and tax law, depending on the legal jurisdiction. The debates, at
least in the United States, have been incomplete due to the failure of policy
makers and advocates to consider the scope and interconnectedness of the
worker classification issues across the full sweep of legal arenas. There is
time, however, to remedy the incompleteness of these policy conversations
before worker classification decisions ossify and path dependence takes hold.
Two interacting forces create the most serious risk for inadequate policy
formulation: (1) silos among legal experts, and (2) first-mover effects. Both of
these factors, silo and first mover, emerge in sharing economy debates in the
United States. Tax experts and other legal specialists operate in distinct silos
leading to a misunderstanding by non-tax analysts of the tax ramifications of
worker classification, and to an under appreciation on the part of tax experts of
the potential influence of “modest” tax rule changes on worker classification
generally. The risks of such misunderstandings can be amplified by first-mover
efforts, such as: (1) platforms’ contractual designation of workers as indepen-
dent contractors to bolster a claim of nonemployer/nonemployee status;
(2) platforms’ support for proposed tax legislation that would “clarify” the
status of sharing workers as independent contractors for tax purposes if they
satisfy a multiple-prong (relatively easy) safe harbor test; and (3) sharing
economy worker litigation to secure employee status.
This Article identifies the incompleteness in the worker classification
debates and argues for the active formulation of policy through a process that
looks beyond individual fields. A more complete conversation requires
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analytical engagement across multiple fields and recognition of the de facto
power of reform in one arena to influence others. Moreover, it is by no means
clear that just because tax might arrive at the legislative drawing table first (due
to first mover effects), that it should drive or shape the broader worker classi-
fication debate.
Keywords: sharing economy, gig economy, tax, employee, independent contrac-
tor, worker classification
Introduction
Over the past few years, a significant global debate has developed over the
classification of workers in the sharing economy either as independent contrac-
tors or as employees. While Uber and Lyft have dominated the spotlight lately,
the worker classification debates extend beyond ridesharing companies and
affect workers across a variety of sectors. The vitality of this debate reflects the
important shifts in the role of workers and the nature of work in an economy
transformed by technology, communication, and interconnectivity. In the world
of contemporary work, classification of workers has arguably become uncertain,
given the gaps between existing case law and new workplace realities. Many
find this uncertainty troubling because these labels do, in fact, matter.
Classification of a worker as an employee, rather than an independent contrac-
tor, can carry a range of implications for worker treatment and protections under
labor law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, and tax law, depending on the legal
jurisdiction.
The debates, however, have been incomplete due to the failure of policy
makers and advocates to consider the scope and interconnectedness of worker
classification issues across the full sweep of legal arenas. The problem is not
intractable, though. There is time to remedy the incompleteness of these policy
conversations before worker classification decisions ossify and path dependence
in legal regimes takes hold.
Two interacting forces create the most serious risk for inadequate and
unintentional policy formulation: (1) silos among legal experts, and (2) first-
mover efforts of sharing economy participants. Lawyers, regulators, policy
makers, and academics operate in areas of expertise—legal silos. As a result,
they explicitly and implicitly make assumptions about the legal effects in other
areas. Problems arise when these assumptions are incorrect—or when experts in
one field are unaware of the impact of their legal and regulatory actions on the
legal trajectory of the same issue in another field. The impact of legal silos is
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compounded by first-mover actions in the sharing economy. The ability to act
first, and successfully, on a legal question can prove powerful and can enable
that position to achieve an advantage going forward. For example, sharing
platforms have contended from the outset that workers are not employees and
that their relationship to the platforms and to end users is that of independent
contractors. Moreover, these platforms have sought to solidify that legal position
indirectly by embracing regulatory reforms in less high-profile legal areas that
would “affirm” worker status as independent contractors.
Both of these factors, silo and first mover, emerge in sharing economy
debates in the United States. The risks from silo-driven misconceptions can be
amplified by strategic first-mover efforts, including: (1) platforms’ documenta-
tion of their relationship with workers drafted to bolster a claim of nonemployer/
nonemployee status; (2) platforms’ support for new tax legislation that would
“clarify” the status of sharing workers as independent contractors for tax pur-
poses if they satisfy a multiple-prong (relatively easy) safe-harbor test; and (3)
sharing economy worker litigation to secure employee status. In some cases, the
“first-mover” actions may be undertaken without an appreciation of their com-
pounding effects due to silos. The platforms, however, have demonstrated an
appreciation for how to use the interplay of silos and first-mover effects to their
advantage. That is, the platforms may not be siloed, but they understand how
the existence of silos more generally offers a strategic opportunity.
The risk created by the intersection of legal silos and first-mover efforts is
that important legal questions might be resolved—here, worker classification—
without adequate appreciation by policymakers and other actors of the overall
effects on labor, work, and social safety nets. Regardless of the specific conclu-
sions on worker classification that ultimately emerge across the law, they should
be the result of careful, thoughtful examination that reflects the best net con-
sensus on the issue. They should not be determined by assumptions and mis-
understandings fueled by first-mover power.
This Article, building on my prior work with co-author Shu-Yi Oei,1 identifies
the incompleteness in the sharing economy worker debates and argues for active
formulation of policy through a process that looks beyond individual fields. A
1 Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 (2016); Shu-Yi
Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers, 8 COLUM. J. OF TAX 56 (2017); Shu-Yi Oei &
Diane Ring, The Senate Tax Bill and the Battles over Worker Classification, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov.
11, 2017), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/11/the-senate-tax-bill-and-
worker-classification.html?utm_source=fark&utm_medium=website&utm_content=link&ICID=
ref_fark; Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification
Fights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2018).
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more complete conversation requires analytical engagement across multiple
fields, and recognition of the de facto power of reform in one arena to influence
others. Acknowledgement of the reality of these incomplete conversations by no
means constitutes an argument for a unified worker classification schema across
all fields. Rather it is a call for full awareness in making legislative and policy
proposals, and for not acting on unfounded assumptions about the substantive
law in other fields or about the porous nature of the boundaries between and
among fields making comparable line-drawing decisions. Moreover, it is by no
means clear that just because tax might arrive at the legislative drawing table
first, that it should drive or shape the broader worker classification debate.
Part I outlines the current context of the worker classification debate includ-
ing the classification of workers under law and their current treatment by
businesses. Part II explores the role of legal silos in the identification of pre-
ferred legal rules and in policy formulation for worker classification in the
sharing economy. Part III studies the reality of first-mover efforts in the sharing
economy and the under appreciated power of such steps in shaping the legal
landscape governing worker classification. Part IV analyzes the intersection of
silos and first-mover efforts, offers a warning regarding the failure to engage in
more complete debates, unpacks the drivers of these incomplete conversations,
and makes recommendations for improved policy analysis. The Conclusion
considers the implications of robust and complete debates and identifies poten-
tial losers from failed efforts to develop a more systematic approach for asses-
sing these legal issues that cut across fields.
I The Context of the Worker Classification
Debates
The reputation of the sharing economy has been built on the innovative plat-
forms and apps developed to connect the provider of goods and services with
consumers.2 Nevertheless, a powerful driver of the sharing, or gig, economy are
the workers who provide the services and assets central to the platform busi-
ness.3 One only needs to envision the prototypical sharing businesses, such as
2 See, e. g., Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, Career Outlook, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (May 2016), available at https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/
2016/article/what-is-the-gig-economy.htm.
3 See, e. g., Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s
Driver Partners in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,843,
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Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit, to appreciate that the services promised by these
apps and platforms are in reality still provided by people. As others have noted,
technology may have changed the ways in which consumers and service provi-
ders connect, but technology has not yet replaced the role of these service
providers.4
All workers, however, are not the same under the law. In a wide variety of
legal contexts, such as tort, employment, worker protection, discrimination, and
tax, the classification of a worker as either an independent contractor or an
employee creates significant benefits and burdens for workers and for busi-
nesses.5 Depending on the legal regime and the actor (e. g. worker or business),
one classification status may be considered more attractive than the other. There
is no uniform rule for distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors, nor is there any binding requirement that classification under one
regime be consistent with classification under other regimes. The tests across
regimes and levels of government (e. g. federal and state) typically turn on multi-
factor tests that incorporate elements such as the nature of control the worker
has over performance of the task, the provision of needed tools, and the location
of work. Depending on the circumstances, the stakes for classification can be
high. For example, in the state-law employment context, classification of a
worker as an employee brings with it a host of worker protections and benefits
such as overtime, minimum wage, and other benefits, with corresponding costs
to the employers.6
Historically, worker classification has been a messy task, which is not
surprising given that the answer turns on the application of a multi-factor test.
Against the backdrop of this longstanding challenge in worker classification, the
2016), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22843.pdf (noting that as of the end of 2015,
more than 460,000 drivers were “actively partnering” with Uber in the United States).
4 See, e. g., sources cited supra note 1; see also JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS SERVICE (2018)
(reminding policy makers that the technological innovations underpinning the sharing econ-
omy do not vitiate the fundamental nature of what is being offered in the market — services that
still must be performed by a human). Although Uber may be successful in eliminating drivers
with the advent of driverless cars, many other platforms, such as TaskRabbit, will continue to
rely on human workers for the foreseeable future.
5 See, e. g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the Sharing Economy, 20
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2016); Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1513–16 (2016); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 480, 484–96 (2016); NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, Policy Brief: The On-Demand Economy & Anti-Discrimination Protections (June 2017),
available at http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/On-Demand-Anti-Discrimination-Protections.pdf.
6 See infra notes 25–29.
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advent of the sharing economy introduced a new level of ambiguity into the
classification and treatment of workers. Part I.A. outlines the typical position
adopted by sharing economy businesses on the classification of their workers.
Part I.B reviews the active litigation over worker status in the sharing economy,
and identifies the common theme running through the parties’ positions.
Finally, Part I.C offers some initial observations regarding the current status of
worker classification for platform businesses.
A Worker Classification Under Current Law
As a formal matter, each legal regime in the United States that has utilized the
employee/independent contractor classification scheme has implemented its
own test.7 That is, classification of workers for one purpose under the law
(e. g. federal income tax) has not generally been dispositive for other legal
purposes (e. g. labor law). But this formal statement of independence across
fields disguises the operational realities of classification practice on the ground.
On balance, courts and government agencies across a variety of fields turn to a
common multi-factor test in determining whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor.8 Thus, while the legal system is not bound to a uni-
versal standard across all fields, in practice the basic structure of the rules has
generally converged.9 That said, test do vary, and in some contexts there may be
a presumption in favor of employee status. For example, the California Labor
7 See, e. g., Berwick v. Uber Techs, Inc., No. 11–46,739 EK at 6–17 (Cal. Dep’t of Labor June 3,
2015), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1988&con
text=historical (describing process for determining worker status under California Labor law);
Sebago v. Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 327–37 (2015) (outlining and applying
Massachusetts law distinguishing independent contractors and employees). Variations on
employee independent contractor tests outside the tax arena include the common law agency
test, the economic realities test, and the “ABA test” applied by states. See, e. g., Robert L.
Redfearn III, Sharing Economy Misclassification: Employees and Independent Contractors in
Transportation Network Companies, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1023 (2016); Rogers, supra note 5,
at 487 n.48.
8 See, e. g., Redfearn III, supra note 7 (discussing multi-factor tests applied outside of tax); Rogers,
supra note 5; Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1.
9 See, e. g., Means & Seiner, supra note 5, at 1527–31 (discussing the similarities between test
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the California labor law regarding for classifying
workers).
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Law, creates a rebuttable presumption that a worker is an employee.10 More
broadly, the California Supreme Court has concluded that under the state’s labor
law multi-factor test for determining worker status as employee or independent
contractor,
the “control-of-work-details” test for determining whether a person rendering service to
another is an “employee” or an excluded “independent contractor” must be applied with
deference to the purposes of the protective legislation. The nature of the work, and the
overall arrangement between the parties, must be examined to determine whether they
come within the “history and fundamental purposes” of the statute.11
Given the degree to which the weighing of factors can be an imprecise task, the
net results can be somewhat unpredictable. If some regime includes a presump-
tion or policy tilt in the analysis (when other regimes do not), further variability
in worker classification conclusions across regimes is likely.
For tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has developed a 20-
factor test to distinguish independent contractors from employees, which
includes a mix of behavioral, financial, and relational factors.12 Courts similarly
10 See DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS LABOR COMM’R’S OFFICE, STATE OF CALI., Independent
Contractor Versus Employee, available at https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontrac
tor.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (discussing California Labor Code Section 3357).
11 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 353–54 (1989) (en banc).
12 See, e. g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Independent Contractor Defined, (Apr. 24, 2018), avail-
able at https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contrac
tor-defined. The factors (listed in Rev. Rul. 87–41, 1987–1 C.B. 296) include: (1) whether the
person for whom the services are performed has the right to require compliance with that
person’s instructions; (2) whether there is worker training; (3) whether the worker’s services are
integrated into business operations; (4) whether the “[s]ervices must be rendered personally”;
(5) whether the person for whom the services are performed hires assistants; (6) whether there is
a continuing relationship; (7) whether set hours are established; (8) whether full-time work is
required; whether the work must be done on the employer’s premises; (9) whether the work
must be performed in a particular sequence; (10) whether the worker must submit regular
reports; (11) whether the worker is paid by the hour, week or month; (12) whether the person for
whom the services are performed “furnish[es] significant tools, materials or equipment”; (13)
whether the worker invests in facilities used in performance of services that are not furnished by
the employer (indicating independent contractor); (14) whether the work can realize a profit or
loss; (15) whether the worker works for more than one firm at the same time; (16) whether the
workers makes her services available to the general public; (17) whether there is a right to
discharge the worker; and (18) whether the worker can terminate the relationship at any time
without incurring liability (indicating employee). See Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra
note 1, at 1020.
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have drawn on these factors in their worker-classification efforts.13 The multi-
factor test in taxation does not incorporate a presumption or preference for a
particular classification. Rather, the expectation is that the classification will be
the result of direct application of the multiple factors, though in a fact-intensive
and messy way. Overall, under the tax law, a worker tends to be classified as an
independent contractor if the person for whom the work is being performed has
the right to control or direct only the result of the work, and not the details of
how it is accomplished.14
B Treatment by Sharing Businesses
Against this backdrop of law delineating between employees and independent
contractors, most sharing-economy platforms have adopted the position that
their gig workers (those that provide the underlying services of the business
model such as drivers for Uber, or services providers for TaskRabbit) are inde-
pendent contractors for all purposes, including tax, labor, and tort law.15 Thus,
for example, on its website, Lyft states in its terms and conditions:
Relationship with Lyft
As a Driver on the Lyft Platform, you acknowledge and agree that you and Lyft are in a
direct business relationship, and the relationship between the parties under this
Agreement is solely that of independent contracting parties. You and Lyft expressly agree
that (1) this is not an employment agreement and does not create an employment relation-
ship between you and Lyft; and (2) no joint venture, franchisor-franchisee, partnership, or
agency relationship is intended or created by this Agreement. You have no authority to
bind Lyft, and you undertake not to hold yourself out as an employee, agent or authorized
representative of Lyft.
Lyft does not, and shall not be deemed to, direct or control you generally or in your
performance under this Agreement specifically, including in connection with your provision
of Services, your acts or omissions, or your operation and maintenance of your vehicle.
You retain the sole right to determine when, where, and for how long you will utilize the
Lyft Platform. You retain the option to accept or to decline or ignore a Rider’s request for
13 See, e. g., Schrantz v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 233 (2011); Levine v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. (RIA) 2005–86 (2005); Rev. Rul. 87–41, 1987–1 C.B. 296.
14 See Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1, at 1020–21; See, e. g., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., supra note 12; Schrantz v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 233 (2011); Levine v. Comm’r, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2005–86 (2005); Rev. Rul. 87–41, 1987–1 C.B. 296.
15 There are some exceptions. For example, the platform “Hello Alfred” (whose name is a play
on the idea of a modern butler) which provides clients with a worker who will perform a wide
variety of tasks in and out of the home uses only full and part-time W-2 employees. HELLO
ALFRED, available at https://www.helloalfred.com/alfreds (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
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Services via the Lyft Platform, or to cancel an accepted request for Services via the Lyft
Platform, subject to Lyft’s then-current cancellation policies. With the exception of any
signage required by law or permit/license rules or requirements, Lyft shall have no right to
require you to: (a) display Lyft’s names, logos or colors on your vehicle(s); or (b) wear a
uniform or any other clothing displaying Lyft’s names, logos or colors. You acknowledge
and agree that you have complete discretion to provide Services or otherwise engage in
other business or employment activities.16
In this provision, Lyft both asserts that drivers are not employees and highlights
the various features of their arrangement that, under a multifactor test for
worker status, would point towards independent contractor status.17 Uber
includes comparable terms in its “Software Sublicense and Online Agreement”
to which drivers must agree, providing in part:
This Agreement is between two co-equal, independent business enterprises that are
separately owned and operated. The Parties intend this Agreement to create the relationship
of principal and independent contractor and not that of employer and employee. The Parties
are not employees, agents, joint venturers or partners of each other for any purpose. As an
independent contractor, you recognize that you are not entitled to unemployment benefits
following termination of the Parties’ relationship.18
TaskRabbit also explicitly asserts in its Terms of Service that “taskers are
independent contractors and not employees of the company.” Moreover,
TaskRabbit, too, includes additional language directed at the worker classifica-
tion tests, stating: “Users hereby acknowledge that company does not supervise,
direct, control or monitor a tasker’s work and is not responsible for the work
performed or the tasks in any manner.”19 These platform positions on worker
classification are not new, but reflect their stance from the outset, and have been
manifest in their decisions on tax reporting, all of which have been consist with
16 LYFT, Terms of Service 19, (last updated Sept. 6, 2018), availabe at https://www.lyft.com/
terms (emphasis added).
17 See also LYFT, Tax information for U.S. drivers, (“Drivers and riders are users of the platform and
aren’t employees of the company. As members of the community platform, drivers and riders
aren’t entitled to benefits, worker’s compensation, or unemployment insurance.”), availabe at
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213582038-2016-tax-info-for-drivers-classified (last visited
Sept. 6, 2018) (emphasis in original).
18 See McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), availabe
at http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D15-2758.pdf (quoting the Uber Software Sublicense
and Online Agreement) (emphasis added).
19 TASKRABBIT, TaskRabbit Terms of Service 1, (last updated May 24, 2018), availabe at https://
www.taskrabbit.com/terms.
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an independent-contractor relationship, not one of employer and employee.20
The unified stance of these major sharing economy platforms on worker status
has met with some resistance both from gig workers and from regulators, who
have pursued litigation and regulatory/legislative reform possibilities. As dis-
cussed more extensively in Part III, Uber drivers have litigated under federal and
state law on worker misclassification, and related labor law and state wage law
violations.21 Additionally, state and local governments have contemplated and,
20 See, e. g., Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1, at 1034–35. Despite their
uniformity in reporting the gig workers as independent contractors, these platforms have varied
in the kind of tax reporting they have undertaken within the independent contract frame. As we
have detailed elsewhere, in 2014 Lyft, Uber, and Sidecar (another ridehailing platform then in
existence) determined they would issue a Form 1099-K (a third-party reporting form) only for
drivers with more than 200 rides and more than $20,000 in payments during the year. These
thresholds for reporting were based on the platforms conclusion that they were “third party
settlement organizations” under tax law and thus not obligated to report on payments made to
workers until those thresholds were crossed. In early 2015, Uber shifted tax-reporting positions.
It still maintained drivers were independent contractors but concluded that Uber would issue a
Form 1099-K to all drivers regardless of number of rides or amounts earned. The rationale for
this shift was not explained. Id.
21 See, e. g., David Stretifeld, Uber Drivers Win Preliminary Class-Action Status in Labor Case, N.
Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), availabe at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/uber-dri
vers-class-action.html?mcubz=1 (reporting drivers sued Uber in North Carolina arguing misclas-
sification as independent contractors under federal labor law). In June 2017, a New York State
administrative labor law judge ruled that three workers (and others similarly situated drivers)
were employees for purposes of unemployment. See, e. g., Josefa Velasequez, Administrative
Law Judge Says Uber Drivers Are Employees, Not Contractors, N.Y. L. J., (June 14, 2017 06:05 PM),
availabe at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202789899357/Administrative-Law-Judge-
Says-Uber-Drivers-Are-Employees-Not-Contractors. Lawsuits are underway in other courts,
including in California and Massachusetts: See, e. g., Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Approval, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL
4,400,737 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) and Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-00262-EMC,
2016 WL 493,189 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), availabe at https://assets.documentcloud.org/docu
ments/3031645/Uber-Settlement-Denied.pdf (consolidated cases). For continuing docket infor-
mation, see O’Connor, No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4,400,737, availabe at https://dockets.
justia.com/docket/california/candce/4:2013cv03826/269290. In June 2017, drivers sued former
Uber CEO (and current chairman) Travis Kalanick, for worker misclassification claims. James v.
Kalanick, No. BC666055 (Super. Ct. of CA, L. A. Cty. filed June 22, 2017). Litigation on the
workers classification question has not be limited to the United States. See, e. g., Dara Kerr, U.K.
Court Rules Uber Drivers are Employees, Not Contractors, Tech Industry, CNET (Oct. 28, 2016 12:11
PM), availabe at https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-uk-court-ruling-drivers-employees-not-con
tractors/. Lyft, too, has been the subject to driver litigation. In March 2017, Lyft agreed to pay
a total of $27 million to settle a class action brought by 200,000 current and former drivers who
challenged their classification by Lyft as independent contractors. Dana Kerr, Lyft Paying $27M
to Settle Driver Classification Suit, Tech Industry, CNET (Mar. 17, 2017 4:14 PM), available at
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in some cases, pursued legal changes in response to the current gig-worker
classification practices. Some government responses have sought to reaffirm the
independent contractor classification,22 and others to cabin it.23
C Initial Observations
What can we take away from this quick survey of the U.S. landscape of gig
worker classification at present? First, on balance, platforms have deter-
mined that classifying workers as independent contractors provides the
best results overall for the platforms, across the range of legal contexts in
which such classification dictates legal benefits and burdens. Second, work-
ers have not uniformly accepted this classification. In some cases, they have
challenged their platform in court, although the net outcome of these legal
contests is ongoing at both a federal and state level across the country. It
https://www.cnet.com/news/lyft-pays-27m-settles-driver-classification-suit-class-action-califor
nia/. Under the settlement, drivers would continue to be classified as independent contractors.
Cotter v. Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2017 WL 1,033,527 (N.D. Cali. Mar. 16, 2017) (Order Granting
Final Approval of Settlement Agreement).
22 See, e. g., The New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and Growth (NEW GIG) Act
of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
senate-bill/1549/text. This legislation was proposed July 13, 2017 by Senate Finance Committee
member John Thune, (R-S.D.). John Thune U.S. Senator for North Dakota, Thune Introduces Bill
to Add Certainty to Worker Classification Rules, Recent Press Releases (July 13, 2017), available at
https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/thune-introduces-bill-to-add-certainty-
to-worker-classification-rules; see also “To establish requirements for participants in the peer-
to-peer economy to be considered independent contractors and not employees for purposes of
several employment related statutes,” H.R. Res. 5918, 114th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. On
Education and the Workforce, July 18, 2016), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/5918.
23 For example, in Fall 2015, the city of Seattle, Washington, approved legislation that would
require network transportation companies (including Uber and Lyft) to bargain with drivers if a
majority want such representation (i. e. drivers can effectively unionize). See Seattle, Wash.,
Ordinance 124,968 (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2647488-LEG-
Collective-Bargaining-ORD-D6-Passed.html; Daniel Beekman, Seattle First U.S. City to Give Uber,
Other Drivers Power to Unionize, Local Politics, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015 at 1:09 PM),
available at http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/unions-for-taxi-uber-drivers-
seattle-council-votes-today/. In August 2017, a federal judge dismissed a challenge to this
legislation. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (W.D. Wash.
2017), available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/17171717/
OrderGrantingMotiontoDismiss–Chamberv.Seattle%28U.S.DistrictCourt-WAWD%29.pdf.
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may take some time for a consensus or predictable pattern to emerge from
the series of litigations (and in some cases settlements). These worker chal-
lenges to classification status primarily arise through labor law and related
claims, rather than in tax. Third, governments have engaged gradually on
the classification front, and, for the most part, have not significantly altered
the underlying legal framework. Certainly, the decision to do so remains a
viable option.
II Silos: Taxation and the Sharing Economy
Not surprisingly, legal experts typically operate in what can be described as
“legal silos” where they possess significant proficiency in one field of law but
generally have only a more superficial understanding of other legal regimes.
Even a single field, such as tax, can be so detailed and complicated (in terms
of relevant statutes, regulations, cases, transactions and agencies) that exper-
tise really can be claimed only for a subset of the field. While perhaps an
inevitable result of the increasing complexity of law and the volume of
material to be absorbed and processed, legal silos create a risk that experts
may advocate certain legal outcomes without an awareness of the repercus-
sions in other legal contexts. One prominent example from the sharing econ-
omy concerns the classification of workers as employees or independent
contractors. As discussed below, the general tenor of the debate (at least in
the United States) presumes the desirability of employee status, seemingly
without understanding of the powerful and complicated tax effects of that
outcome. Part II.A. reviews the presumptions in favor of employee status, and
Part II.B. outlines the complicated tax perspective on worker classification.
Together, they reveal the space in which misunderstandings and assumptions
can arise.
A Assumptions about the Desirability of Employee Status
A relatively common feature of the U.S. employee-independent contractor
debate in the sharing economy, particularly expressed through ongoing litiga-
tion, is the expectation that workers likely should and/or want to be classified as
employees and not independent contractors. These views emerge most strongly
in contexts in which sharing-economy workers are seeking labor protections
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afforded exclusively to individuals classified as employees.24 But what precisely
are the labor protection benefits of being classified as an employee?
At an individual worker level, classification as an employee can bring a host
of benefits (federal and state) including: minimum wage and overtime pay
protections,25 guarantees of unpaid leave,26 health and safety regulations,27
and various antidiscrimination protections.28 On a group basis, employee clas-
sification allows workers to collectively bargain under the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act.29 Given this extensive array of work-related ben-
efits and protections available to those classified as “employees” under each
applicable regime, the efforts by worker advocates to ensure employee classifi-
cation is unsurprising. But as explored further below, although workers have
much to gain from being employees under labor and employment provisions,
that same classification may be problematic for them from a tax perspective.
To be clear, there is certainly evidence that not all platform workers would
share the view that employee status is preferable, even among those who per-
form primarily services (e. g. TaskRabbit, Uber, Lyft), as opposed to provide
assets (AirBnb). In a study of online conversations of Uber and Lyft drivers,
my co-author and I observed many instances in which drivers expressed a
preference for their current status as independent contractors. In particular,
they focused on the benefits of flexibility, independence, and of “not having a
boss.”30 Additionally, drivers expressed concern that if they were to be newly
classified as employees, the IRS would audit them for unpaid back taxes,
including employment taxes.
24 See, e. g., Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1511 (2016) (noting litigation against Uber and Lyft by former drivers seeking classification
as employees).
25 See, e. g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Fair Labor Standards Act); Department of Labor, Wage and Hour
Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the States (July 1, 2018) (mapping minimum wages across the
50 states and comparing to federal minimum), available at https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwa
geamerica.htm#stateDetails.
26 29 U.S.C. § 2612 ch. 28 (Family Medical Leave Act).
27 29 U.S.C. § 651 ch. 15 (Occupational Health and Safety Act).
28 See, e. g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. No. 88–352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. cg. 14,
§ 621 et eq. (29 U.S.C. § 630); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ch. 126, § 12,101
et seq.
29 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169 (2012).
30 Oei & Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers, supra note 1, at 88 (reporting and assessing driver
comments on their worker classification).
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To the extent this expectation (that such workers would likely prefer
employee status) is grounded in an analysis of worker benefits in one area of
law (e. g. employment law), an extension beyond that area (either explicitly or
implicitly) requires some appreciation of the classification effects in that new
realm. As evidenced below in the Part II.B, that is not always an easy task.
Certain features of employee classification for tax purposes are relatively salient
and understood outside of the tax. But others may not be and may justify a more
ambiguous conclusion about worker classification preferences.
B Tax Implications of Status as an Employee or Independent
Contractor
Status as an employee or independent contractor directly effects taxation of
workers in two very specific ways. First, the reporting and payment of employ-
ment taxes (social security and Medicare tax)31 and withholding of income tax
turns on worker status. All workers are required to have the same total amount
paid as employment taxes based on their wages. But a worker’s status as
employee or independent contractor determines who must do the reporting
and the paying of taxes to the government.32 In the case of employees, both
the social security tax33 and the Medicare tax34 are paid half by employees and
half by the employer. However, the employer is responsible for collecting and
transmitting all of the tax to the government. Thus, for employees, the reporting,
withholding, and half of the payment burden are borne by the employer.35
If instead a worker is an independent contractor, the same total amount of
social security and Medicare taxes are due, but the worker pays both halves (i. e.
12.4% social security and 2.9% Medicare) and must handle the reporting and
transmission of tax to the government. The worker, however, does get a deduc-
tion for the “employer” half of the social security and Medicare taxes.36 As with
31 See I.R.C. §§ 3401–3402, 3501 (2012).
32 See Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1, at 1042 (reviewing treatment of
employment taxes for employees and independent contractors).
33 The social security tax rate is 6.2% each for employee and for employer, with a wage base
capped at $132,900 for 2019. I.R.C. § 1401(a) (2012).
34 The employer and employee each pay the Medicare tax at a rate of 1.45%. Id. § 1401(b).
35 Empirically, the question of whether the portion paid of wage taxes by the employer out of
her own pocket is ultimately borne by the employer or effectively shifted to the employee,
remains a subject of study and debate.
36 Assuming prices adjusted in the market, it should not matter whether that half of the wage
taxes are paid by the employer and deducted, or by the worker as independent contractor and
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employees, independent contractors are responsible for the entirety of the
income tax due, but now must ensure the payment of that tax to the government
themselves. Given the absence of employer withholding, independent contrac-
tors generally are required to pay estimated taxes during the year (this mechan-
ism seeks to guarantee that the full tax payments are actually made and that the
taxpayer does not find herself with an enormous tax bill at year-end).37 The net
benefit of employee status, as regards income taxes, is release from the admin-
istrative and planning burden of reporting and paying of estimated taxes.
Second, the difference between employee and independent contractor
status is particularly stark with regards to the ability to deduct business
expenses — and for those workers who regularly incur substantial expenses
(e. g. ridesharing drivers on platforms such as Uber and Lyft)38—this difference
is important. As independent contractors, such workers would be entitled to
deduct their legitimate business costs against their driving and other income.39
However, the tax picture for deductions looks distinctly different for any
workers deemed to be employees of a platform. Prior to the 2017 tax reform
(and resuming again in 2026), such employee-workers would in theory be able
to deduct their ordinary and necessary expenses incurred, but in reality would
deducted. However, whether wages do fully adjust and how fast is an empirical question that
remains in dispute.
37 See I.R.C. § 6654(a), (d) (2012); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 505 at 24–32,
WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX (2017) (detailing circumstances under which estimated tax
payments are required). Failure to meet estimated tax payment obligations brings its own
penalties. See, e. g., § 6654.
38 Likely expenses include car maintenance, gas, and insurance.
39 I.R.C. § 162 (2012). Such taxpayers would encounter two constraints in reporting and secur-
ing these deductions: (1) distinguishing personal from business expenses, and (2) maintaining
adequate documentation (e. g., miles driven, receipts).
Many drivers rely on personal vehicles in their ridesharing work (and the portion of expenses
incurred in connection with their personal use of the vehicles would not be deductible).
Evidence indicates that as of December 2014, 52% of Uber “partner-drivers” were part-time,
with no previous driving experience, and driving fewer than 30hours per week. BENENESON
STRATEGY GRP., UBER: THE DRIVER ROADMAP (2015), available at https://newsroom.uber.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf (Uber commissioned study drawing on dri-
ver interviews). Moreover, drivers tend to use personal vehicles. See generally UBER, UBER
VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS, BOSTON, available at https://www.uber.com/drive/boston/vehicle-
requirements/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2017); LYFT, VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS, available at https://
help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/214219557-Vehicle-requirements (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
Driving-related costs are generally allocated based on mileage. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. NO. 463 at 16–17, TRAVEL, ENTERTAINMENT, GIFT, AND CAR EXPENSES (2016); Oei & Ring,
Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1, at 1010–11.
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find the deduction limited.40 These taxpayers/employees would follow the
same initial steps of identifying and documenting business (as opposed to
personal) expenses, but then would face an additional hurdle: in pre-2018 and
post-2025 tax years, employees can only deduct business expenses to the
extent they exceed 2% of the employee’s adjusted gross income.41 As a
practical matter, this limitation poses a significant barrier to many employees’
ability to deduct these employment-related business expenses. Post-2017 and
through 2025, the deduction situation for employee workers is even less
attractive. The 2017 tax reform suspended the deductibility of employee busi-
ness expenses entirely through 2025.42 During this window, no deduction for
business expenses incurred by employees will be available regardless of the
size of those deductions relative to the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
Until December 2017, the “full” deduction for business expenses was the
primary deduction-based advantage for independent contractors over employ-
ees.43 However, the tax reform enacted in December 2017 added a new deduction
available to independent contractors, but not employees. New section 199A
grants independent contractors (along with partners and shareholders of an S
corporation) a deduction of up to 20% of their qualified business income
(“QBI“).44 For a taxpayer otherwise facing a top marginal rate of 37% in 2018,
the 20% deduction would result in an effective rate on that income of 29.6%.45
Although a number of restrictions can limit or even preclude access to the
40 I.R.C. § 67 (2017) (implementing a 2% floor on “miscellaneous itemized deductions”).
41 Under the “2-percent floor rule,” certain deductions (miscellaneous itemized deductions) to
which an individual taxpayer is otherwise entitled, can be deducted only to the extent that in
aggregate they exceed 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI). Id. § 67. Broadly
speaking, a taxpayer’s AGI is his or her gross income minus certain expenses such as trade or
business expenses (other than those incurred in the trade or business of being an employee). Id.
§ 62. For taxpayer’s whose income exceeds a certain threshold (adjusted annually for inflation),
deductions that survive the limitation in § 67, or are not subject to that limitation, may be
subject to the phaseout rule in I.R.C. § 68. Under the phaseout rule, many of these surviving
deductions will be phased out as the taxpayer’s AGI exceeds the specified threshold and will be
completely phased out at when AGI reaches an upper cap. Id. § 68.
42 Id. § 67(g).
43 See infra this section for discussion of the ability of employees to deduct comparable
expenses incurred directly in the context of performing their sharing economy work.
44 I.R.C. § 199A (2012).
45 Consider the following simplified example: A taxpayer is subject to the top marginal rate of
37% on $100 of income. If taxpayer then determines that this $100 constitutes QBI under § 199A
and that a full § 199A deduction of 20% is available based on that income, the taxpayer would
be entitled to a deduction equal to $20. Thus, this taxpayer would be taxed at 37% on $80
income and would owe 29.6 in tax. The taxpayer’s effective tax rate would be 29.6% (calculated
as total tax paid of $29.60 divided by total income $100).
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deduction, most of these constraints apply only for taxpayers with income above
a specified threshold ($157,500 for a single filer, and $315,000 for a joint
return).46
It is likely that many sharing-economy workers find themselves with income
below such thresholds and not subject to these restrictions, and thus able to
secure the 20% deduction. This outcome enhances the upside of independent
contractor classification at no cost to the business for (or through) which they
are providing their services (e. g. Uber, Lyft, TaskRabbit). To the extent many
platform businesses are seeking to classify large groups of workers as indepen-
dent contractors (see Part III infra), the introduction of section 199A into the tax
law adds an extra tool in their efforts to persuade, nudge, or push workers into
that category. Whether this extra incentive will make a significant difference
depends on a number of factors, including the plausibility of any claim that a
worker is in fact an independent contractor. This is a subject we explore in other
work,47 but, for present purposes, we can observe that section 199A has the
potential to increase efforts to claim independent contractor status for some
workers, and thereby put additional pressure on various measures for locking-in
that legal status.
C Mixed Effects of Taxation
Ultimately, in determining whether a worker would prefer to be treated as an
employee or an independent contract for tax purposes, the question is how the
worker would trade off the loss of tax deductions (either in part, pre-2017 and
post-2025 due to the limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions of employ-
ees, or in full during 2018–2025) with the benefit of reduced administrative and
payment burdens (through not having to personally report, withhold, and sub-
mit the wage and income taxes, and pay the employer share of wage taxes). The
answer to this question will likely vary by individual taxpayer and by sector. For
example, some ridesharing drivers who have unrelated employment have sought
to meet their obligations for quarterly reporting and taxpaying on rideshare
income by increasing the withholding on their unrelated employee wages in
46 I.R.C. 199A(e)(2) (adjusted for inflation). These taxable income thresholds are based on total
income (not limited to the income from the qualified trade or business) without inclusion of the
20% deduction.
47 Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Tax Law’s Workplace Shift, BOSTON U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019–
2020).
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another job.48 Effectively, these drivers have rolled the administration, reporting
and withholding obligations from their sharing work into their other job where
these tasks are handled by their nonrideshare employer. Of course, these drivers
still bear the financial burden49 of paying the “employer” share of the wage
taxes on the rideshare income by having to pay self-employment taxes with their
Form 1040. For sharing economy workers with significant out-of-pocket busi-
ness-related expenses, the ability to ensure full deductibility (as an independent
contractor) might outweigh the costs of reporting and paying taxes, especially if
they are otherwise employed (and able to shift the de facto administrative
burden to their other employer).
However, other sharing-economy workers with few significant out-of-pocket
costs (typically not drivers) may find the administrative and tax payment bur-
dens far exceed any potential benefit from expense deductibility. This assess-
ment of the tax deduction/administrative burden calculus may be especially true
for those who lack employment outside the sharing economy through which
they could indirectly arrange payment and reporting of tax on their ridesharing
income.
The important take-away from the tax analysis is that worker classification
affects taxation on multiple dimensions, and the net effect varies by industry
and by individual worker characteristics. Just from a tax perspective, it is not
clear that one specific worker classification would be universally (or predomi-
nantly) preferred by sharing economy workers. The detailed examination here of
these divergent tax impacts from worker classification serves to emphasize how
experts operating in distinct legal silos50 might grasp the basic distinction
between independent contractors and employees regarding tax compliance,
but could easily have missed the significant “haircut”51 for deductible expenses
incurred by workers classified as employees, or the introduction of an entirely
new deduction (section 199A). However, the silo effect operates in both direc-
tions. Just as nontax experts may have missed or failed to appreciate certain tax
outcomes, the tax community has demonstrated a limited appreciation of the
importance of the worker classification debate outside of tax and how the
debates across all fields may ultimately intersect. This example is further con-
sidered in Part IV.
48 See Oei & Ring, Tax Lives of Uber Drivers, supra note 1.
49 See supra note 36 for a discussion of the market adjustments for any shift in who formally
owes the employer half of wage taxes.
50 The effect of legal silos can be understood as a function of both expertise and the practical
isolation of many legal fields from each other.
51 A trimming of something, in this case deductible expenses.
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III First-Mover Effects in Sharing Economy Legal
Debates
The relative newness of the sharing economy and its ability to occupy plausibly
ambiguous regulatory gray zones in a number of fields has triggered much
debate, both academic and legal. At issue is the appropriate treatment of
businesses, activities and participants under current law, as well as the ideal
legal treatment on a forward-looking basis.52 Various constituents have sought
to shape this emerging legal debate through contract, rhetoric, litigation, local
legislation, and federal legislation. In the process of doing so, most actors have
been focused on a specific legal context (e. g. employment law, labor negotia-
tions, or tax law). Whether intentional or not, these steps have the potential to
provide significant first-mover53 advantages to the successful parties.54 In other
work, my co-author and I have discussed the first-mover strategies of sharing-
economy businesses seeking to avoid, at least for some period of time, regula-
tion that might otherwise seem to apply to a business operating in a commercial
sector (such as hotels or transportation). This essay identifies efforts by various
parties to be the first to frame and/or solidify the classification of sharing
economy workers as either employees or independent contractors through sev-
eral available mechanisms. Although there is no expectation that any single
litigation, settlement, local ordinance, or federal legislation would be the com-
plete, definitive and final word on the debated classification issues in the
sharing economy, early victories in any of these arenas provide first-mover
advantages to the successful party. These efforts (and their potential rewards)
52 See, e. g., Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1.
53 The first mover concept plays a rich role in the analysis of firms and markets over the past
half century. See, e. g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1st ed. Harvard Univ.
Press 1960); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS, (2007); M.
B. Lieberman & D.B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41–58 (1988);
M.B. Lieberman & D.B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and Link with
the Resource-Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1111–25 (1998); E. Gal-Or, First Mover and
Second Mover Advantages, 26 (No. 3) INT’L ECON. REV. 649–53 (1985); Michael Kopel & Clemens
Löffler, Commitment, First-Mover-, and Second-Mover Advantage, 94 (2) J. ECON. 143–66 (2007).
54 Depending on the context and the actors, the primary focus and motivation may be to solve
a specific problem, such as securing benefits for a client or providing immediate relief to
workers seeking some recalibration in the balance of power with sharing economy platforms.
However, it is not inconsistent with such first-line motives that the actors are effectively
pursuing first-mover status with the potential to lock-in certain characterizations or interpreta-
tions of existing sharing economy relationships.
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are neither surprising nor unusual, but in combination with legal silos, they
pose a risk of law moving in directions not fully anticipated or intended by
legislators, courts, or society. This Part explores fours aspects of first-mover
action in the sharing economy. Then Part IV considers the effects of legal silos
and first-movers in tandem.
A Contracts, Labeling and Rhetoric
The platform businesses themselves have been leaders in using contract, label-
ing, and rhetoric to advance a vision of the platform-worker relationship as one
of business intermediary and independent contractor. As detailed above in Part
II.B, before the sharing economy attracted significant attention (from market
participants or the legal system), the platform businesses themselves had
already declared that sharing workers were independent contractors.55 This
step was powerful as it locked the parties into reporting and compliance conduct
consistent with a classification that would then require litigation or legislation to
change.56 Effectively, it established the baseline against which challengers
would then have to react.
Beyond using contract to stake out a classification, platforms also have
relied on developing a narrative of their business model that supported the
independent contractor claim. Professor Shu-Yi Oei offers a thoughtful analysis
of this powerful and strategic use of language, descriptors and narrative as a
resilient first-mover technique in her essay, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of
Narrative and the Worker Classification Fights.57 In particular, she observes that
the platforms initially framed the business model as a “sharing economy”—a
framing which emphasized a non-commercial and non-professional vision of the
services provided and highlighted the almost “neighborly” sharing underpin-
ning the transactions. But the platforms then shifted to a “gig” characterization
of the work. Although the sharing message had been useful initially in trying to
justify noncompliance with business regulations (e. g. hotel, transportation), the
55 See supra Part II.B.
56 Of course, the parties could change the treatment by contract, and accordingly their con-
duct. However, given that the sharing platforms have evidenced a strong preference for the
current contractual classification of independent contractor, and they present the terms to the
workers, change is unlikely to come without outside intervention.
57 Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk, supra note 1.
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more pressing concern for the platforms became the classification of workers
across a variety of legal regimes. The shift to characterizing the work performed
by platform workers as gig work resonated with the independent contractor
classification. Professor Oei identifies58 multiple ways in which the platforms
promote this vision, including: (1) Uber’s and Lyft’s urging drivers to “be your
own boss;”59 and (2) TaskRabbit’s suggestion that the platform enables workers
to develop their own business.60 Professor Oei then builds on these examples to
explore the impact that such rhetoric can have in shaping discourse and debate,
and tilting the existing playing field toward the independent contractor classi-
fication urged by sharing platforms. In combination with their contracts, the
rhetoric provides platforms with a strong position from which to defend and
promote their classification practices.
Following this true first-mover action, by which the platforms established
the backdrop against which all other classification efforts respond, all relevant
actors in the sharing economy (platform businesses, workers, and legislators)
have pursued multiple mechanisms by which to cement their preferred worker
classification for the sharing economy.
B Worker Litigation
Although the platform businesses have been the true first-movers, making
significant decisions at the outset, other relevant parties have sought to create
their own version of first-mover effects by staking out an early ruling on worker
classification in some legal venue. For example, platform workers have insti-
tuted a variety of lawsuits challenging their treatment under state and federal
labor law and argued that they should be classified as employees and thus
entitled to all of the protections afforded that status. Examples include several
58 Id. at 22–23.
59 UBER, Be Your Own Boss: Drive on the Uber Platform, UBER NEWSROOM (Sept. 29, 2014),
available at https://newsroom.uber.com/us-Louisiana’s/be-your-own-boss-drive-on-the-uber-
platform/ (“Partners who drive on the Uber platform love it because they make higher earnings
than traditional cab drivers and have the flexibility to set their own hours.”). LYFT, Drive toward
what matters to you, WHY LYFT available at https://www.lyft.com/driver/why-drive-with-lyft
(last visited July 31, 2018) (“Be your own boss”).
60 TASKRABBIT, Why Should I be a Tasker?, TASKRABBIT SUPPORT, available at https://support.
taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411060-Why-should-I-be-a-Tasker- (last updated July 30,
2018) (“TaskRabbit is a platform that enables individuals to make a meaningful income by
building their own business.”).
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cases against Uber in California,61 a case against Uber in Massachusetts,62 a case
against Lyft in California,63 a case against Grubhub in California,64 a case
against DoorDash in California,65 and rulings by state employment tribunals
regarding Uber drivers.66 Consistent with this abbreviated list, approximately
one-third of the classification challenges during the period 2012–2016 were
against Uber.67
In a recent paper, Professor Dubal argues that the most concerted efforts to
address the treatment of platform workers have been through these legal
challenges to classification status. She reports that workers and their advo-
cates embraced this strategy and affirmatively sought to freeze other efforts to
address platform worker conditions in order to allow their litigation to play out
in the courts.68 Professor Dubal cites as evidence two specific examples: (1) the
decision by a California state legislator not to pursue a bill allowing collective
bargaining for gig workers because the labor community asked the legislator to
wait until the O’Connor class action went to trial69; and (2) platform drivers’
61 See, e. g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4,400,737 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2016) and Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-00262-EMC, 2016 WL 493,189 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 9, 2016) (consolidated cases); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.
2016) and Gillette v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-05241-EMC, 2016 WL 7,470,557 (9th Cir. 2016)
(consolidated cases).
62 See Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SUCV201204490, 2015 WL 728,187 (Mass. Super. Jan.
26, 2015).
63 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 17–15,648, 2017 WL 4,535,961 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2017).
64 Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
65 Keith Yandell, An Update on Dasher Class Action, DOORDASH (Apr. 10, 2017), available at https://
blog.doordash.com/an-update-on-dasher-class-action-6990643be500 (announcing DoorDash’s set-
tlement of a lawsuit regarding classification of workers for $3.5 million).
66 See, e. g., Taxi Workers Alliance v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 016–23,858 (N.Y. Unempl. Ins. App.
Bd., ALJ Burrows 2017), available at http://www.almcms.com/contrib/content/uploads/sites/
292/2017/06/ALJ-Decision-Redacted.pdf (three Uber drivers found by New York State unemploy-
ment insurance appeal board to be employees for purposes of state unemployment benefits);
McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), available at
http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D15-2758.pdf (affirming non-employee status of Uber
drivers).
67 V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification
Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 740, 757 (2017) (citing her own
unpublished article, Ruth Collier, V.B. Dubal and Christopher Carter, Disrupting Regulation and
Regulating Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States, 16 (4) PERSP. ON POL. 919 (2018),
available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718001093).
68 Id. at 744–45.
69 Id. (citing specific examples of California Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez “not mov[ing]
forward with [a] gig workers bill … because the labor community asked them to hold off until
O’Connor went to trial”).
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decision to “hold off on their organization and affiliation with a union” until
the O’Connor case was decided.70 However, despite these efforts to address
worker status through litigation, the results have been limited. Some indivi-
dual workers have been successful in labor tribunal decisions on their status
(securing classification as an employee with the corresponding benefits).71 But
these labor tribunal decisions are not binding for businesses regarding other
workers―thus they do not contribute to a dramatic overhaul of worker classi-
fication in the sharing economy. Additionally, a number of Uber cases have
been settled by the platform, thereby ensuring no adverse ruling and no
precedential value.72 Other major class actions have been subject to chal-
lenges. In September 2017, the 9th Circuit heard oral arguments in the con-
solidated appeal of four Uber class actions73 in which Uber argued that the
clauses signed by drivers to surrender their rights to pursue class actions and
to agree to arbitration were legally enforceable.74 Shortly thereafter, the 9th
Circuit issued an order75 stating that the cases are withdrawn from submission
pending resolution of three other cases76 (not involving the sharing economy)
before the Supreme Court on the same question regarding the validity of class
waivers in a worker-arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court then upheld the
waivers in May 2018,77 a decision which will limit some workers’ ability to
challenge their classification in court.
70 Id.
71 See, e. g., Ruth Berins Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms and Gig
Work: The Failure to Regulate 21–22 (Inst. for Res. on Lab. & Emp., Working Paper No. 106–17,
2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039742.
72 Id. at 22.
73 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4,400,737 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2016) and Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-00262-EMC, 2016 WL 493,189 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9,
2016) (consolidated cases); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); Rio v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-CV-03667-EMC, 2015 WL 9,025,147 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015), appeal
filed, No. 15–17,475 (9th Cir. 2015).
74 Order for Oral Argument, O’Connor, 2016 WL 4,400,737 and Yucesoy, 2016 WL 493,189 (Aug.
11, 2017), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/08/17/14-16078
Hearing notice 8.11.pdf; see also Daniel Wiessner, 9Th Circuit may wait for SCOTUS ruling on
waivers before deciding Uber appeals, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2017, available at https://www.reuters.
com/article/employment-uber/9th-circuit-may-wait-for-scotus-ruling-on-waivers-before-decid
ing-uber-appeals-idUSL2N1M229Z.
75 9th Circuit Order, O’Connor, 2016 WL 4,400,737 and Yucesoy, 2016 WL 493,189 (Sept. 22,
2017), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/09/22/14-160789.22order.
pdf.
76 NLRB. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 16–307 (U.S. May 21, 2018); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No.
16–285 (U.S. May 21, 2018); and Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, No. 16–300 (May 21, 2018).
77 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018).
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In 2018, a series of decisions across states and tribunals continues to
present a mixed picture on classification. A California court ruled in
February 2018 that a Grubhub delivery driver was an independent contractor
under state law.78 Similarly, in April 2018, a federal court in Pennsylvania
ruled on summary judgment that an Uber driver was an independent contrac-
tor and not an employee under FLSA.79 But in July 2018, the New York State
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board concluded in a final determination
that three Uber drivers were employees for purposes of state unemployment
insurance benefits (rendering them entitled to benefits).80 Finally, in a ruling
with potentially broad implications in California, the California Supreme Court
adopted a new test for worker classification that is expected to make it more
difficult for businesses to classify workers as independent contractors under
state law.81
Thus, to date, a definitive trajectory has not yet emerged from the litiga-
tion path taken by platform workers to challenge their classification as inde-
pendent drivers. If these cases ultimately reach a substantive conclusion on
worker classification, the determination of status could have a far reach―both
in terms of number of workers covered and precedential effect. However, even
a determination that these drivers constitute employees under the relevant law
could have a more limited effect than the parties anticipate. Based on an
analysis of earlier non-gig lawsuits challenging worker classification,
Professor Dubal argues that the longer-term benefits to workers prevailing in
classification litigation have been limited due to: (1) the political and eco-
nomic power of the employers, and (2) the parties’ redrafting of workers’
contracts.82
78 Lawson v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., and Grubhub Inc., No. 3–15-cv-05128-JSC, Opinion (Feb.
8, 2018).
79 Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc. No. 16–573 (E.D. PA, Apt. 2018) (Memorandum re:
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment).
80 State of New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Decision in the Matter of Uber
Technologies, Inc. Appeal Board No. 596,722, A.L.J. Case No. 016–234,949, July 12, 2018),
available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4613843-Uber-AB-Decision-Redacted.
html.
81 Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Op. No. S222732
(Apr. 30, 2018), available at https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/dynamex-operations-est-inc-v-
superior-court-34584. See, e. g., Heather Field, Tax Implications of the Recent Dynamex Ruling on
Worker Classification, Surly Subgroup (May 3, 2018), available at https://surlysubgroup.com/
2018/05/03/tax-implications-of-the-recent-dynamex-worker-classification-ruling/.
82 See Dubal, supra note 67, at 746–748.
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C State and Local Legislative Reform
The obvious path for more universal impact on worker classification remains at the
legislative level. The two major state efforts to secure some limited benefits for
sharing economy workers emerged in California and New York but have yet to
produce results. The California legislation,83 referenced above in Part III.B, sought
to provide certain platform workers, who are treated as independent contractors by
the platform, with the right to collectively bargain. But as noted earlier, this
legislation was withdrawn84 apparently due to a strategic decision to let related
litigation take priority,85 and due to concern over potential anti-trust challenges.86
The bill’s sponsor had hoped to have a revised bill passed before the end of 2018.87
The New York legislation, which was reportedly under consideration in early
2017 and is now on hold, would establish guidelines for a portable benefits plan
that platform businesses could offer their workers. Under the plan, businesses
would contribute to a plan for each worker and the worker could use the funds
to purchase health insurance and other benefits. The trade-off, however, appears
to be that participating workers would be considered independent contractors,
not employees, under state law. One draft version of the legislation was circu-
lated (perhaps not surprisingly) by platform business Handy (a home services
platform), given that it offered a compromise that did not sacrifice classification
of workers as independent contractors.88 More generally, the bill was sup-
ported89 by Tech:NYC, a tech lobby organization “represent[ing] New York’s
83 Hosting Platforms: Independent Contractors, AB-1727, Cali. Legislature, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess.
(Cali 2016), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201520160AB1727
84 Id.
85 See supra Part III.B.
86 See, e. g., Kate Conger, California bill to give gig workers organizing rights stalls over antitrust
concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 21, 2016), available at https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/21/califor
nia-bill-to-give-gig-workers-organizing-rights-stalls-over-antitrust-concerns/ (questions as to
whether independent contractor collective bargaining rights would violate anti-trust laws).
87 Liam Dillon, The Question that Continues to Loom over Uber and Lyft – and Vex Lawyers, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017, 12:05 AM), available at http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-uber-
unionization-bill-20170402-htmlstory.html (Gonzalez Fletcher “hopes to author a bill that would
reach the governor’s desk by the end of 2018.”).
88 Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Unions, Gig-Economy Firms Gear Up for New York Benefits
Battle, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2016, 6:21 AM), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-labor-
tech-benefits/unions-gig-economy-firms-gear-up-for-new-york-benefits-battle-idUSKBN13N0YL.
89 See, e. g., Josh Eidelson, It’s a New Game for Uber Driers if New York Passes This Law,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2017, 8:00 AM EST), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-01-10/it-s-a-new-game-for-uber-drivers-if-new-york-passes-this-law.
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Tech Economy,” and whose members (among many others) include Uber and
Handy.90 In 2017, New York Governor Cuomo announced a task force91 to study
the prospect of portable benefits, thereby putting legislative reform on hold.92
In contrast to the more limited benefits at stake in the New York and
California proposals, a Washington state bill93 introduced in 2017 would provide
stronger employee-type benefits to covered workers. The bill would: (1) require a
mandatory benefits plan for businesses with more than 50 workers; (2) require
substantial contributions to the plan; (3) include mandatory workers’ compensa-
tion plus a range of other optional benefits (including health insurance, paid
time off and retirement benefits); and (4) offer a compromise on classification
(workers would not forfeit employee status, but a business’s provision of bene-
fits under the bill would not be evidence of an employment relationship between
the platform and workers in future litigation).94 As of March 2019, the bill
remains in committee in the House.95
Numerous other states have moved in the opposite direction by enacting
legislation that has cemented the status of platform drivers as independent
contractors, without securing offsetting benefits for workers. For example, on
May 9, 2017, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed into law96 the “Transportation
Network Companies Act” (HB221).97 The new provision deems platform drivers to
be independent contractors if the platform satisfies four, very easy to meet,
requirements (platform does not set work hours, does not bar driver from
90 TECH:NYC, Our Members, available at https://www.technyc.org/our-members/ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018).
91 Andrew Cuomo,New York State: Ever Upward 2017, State of the State, 147–48 (2017), available at
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/2017StateoftheStateBook.
pdf.
92 Sophie Quinton,With Growth of the Gig Economy, States Rethink HowWorkers Get Benefits, THE
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 22, 2017), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/22/with-growth-of-the-gig-economy-states-rethink-how-workers-
get-benefits.
93 H.B. 2109, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017), available at https://onlabor.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/2109.pdf.
94 Maia Usui, A Blueprint for Progressive Federalism: Washington State’s Portable Benefits Bill,
ONLABOR (May 17th, 2017), available at https://onlabor.org/a-blueprint-for-progressive-federal
ism-washington-states-portable-benefits-bill/.
95 WASH. STATE LEGIS., Bill Status-at-a-Glance, H.B. 2109 (Mar. 16, 2019 07:31 AM), available at
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=2109&Initiative=false&Year=2019.
96 News Release, Governor Scott Signs 11 Bills Into Law, Rick Scott 45th Governor of Florida
(May 9, 2017), available at https://www.flgov.com/2017/05/09/governor-scott-signs-11-bills-
into-law/.
97 H.B. 221, 2017 Legislature (Fla. 2017), available at https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/
2017/221/BillText/er/PDF.
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other work, does not bar driver from other platforms, and platform signs a
contract with the driver that the driver is an independent contractor).98 Florida
is not alone in this legislative action.99 Other states, including North Carolina,100
Arkansas101 and Indiana102 include classification of drivers as independent
contractors as part of their new transportation network company legislation.103
The one legislative act that has shown some signs of being successful in
securing benefits for platform drivers is the ordinance104 passed by the City of
Seattle Washington in fall 2015. Pursuant to the Seattle law, a business that hires
or contracts with taxi drivers, for-hire transportation companies or transporta-
tion network companies must bargain with the drivers if a majority of the drivers
seek to be so represented. Effectively, Seattle is permitting Uber and Lyft drivers
to unionize.105 The law survived a challenge by the Chamber of Commerce,106
which had argued that the ordinance exceeded the city’s proper exercise of
authority and that the law violated the Sherman Act (antitrust) and
Washington state antitrust law. In May 2018, the 9th Circuit ruled that a
Seattle ordinance is not exempt from federal antitrust law (Sherman Act) pre-
emption, thus keeping the law tied up in litigation. But, importantly for drivers
seeking de facto unionization, the court also ruled that the ordinance does not
violate the NLRA and the court basically implied that it is possible for the state
98 Id.
99 See, e. g., Dubal, supra note 67, at 754.
100 N.C. GEN. STAT. Art. 10a, §§ 20–280.1 to 0.10 (2018), available at https://www.ncga.state.
nc.us/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/ByArticle/Chapter_20/Article_10A.pdf (creating a rebut-
table presumption that drivers are independent contractors, section 20–280.8).
101 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23–13–719 (2018).
102 IND. CODE §§ 8.2.1–19.1–1 to −20 (2018), available at https://law.justia.com/codes/indiana/
2015/title-8/article-2.1/chapter-19.1/.
103 See generally Heather Somerville & Dan Levine, U.S. States Pass Laws Backing Uber’s View
of Drivers as Independent Contractors, REUTERS, (Dec. 10, 2015, 2:23 PM), available at https://
www.reuters.com/article/uber-statelaws/u-s-states-pass-laws-backing-ubers-view-of-drivers-as-
contractors-idUSL1N13Z1YP20151210.
104 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124,968 (Dec. 23, 2015), available at http://clerk.seattle.gov/~
legislativeItems/Ordinances/Ord_124968.pdf.
105 Diane Ring, The Front Lines of Sharing Economy Legal Debates, THE SURLY SUBGROUP (Aug. 11,
2017), available at https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/08/11/the-front-lines-of-sharing-economy-legal-
debates/.
106 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 274F. Supp. 3d 1140 (W.D. Wash. 2017), avail-
able at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/17171717/Order
GrantingMotiontoDismiss–Chamberv.Seattle%28U.S.DistrictCourt-WAWD%29.pdf.
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legislature to create an ordinance that is both Sherman Act and NLRA compliant
(even though the current ordinance did not satisfactorily do so).107
D Proposed Federal Tax Reform
While the above-detailed battle over worker classification (predominantly under
state law) has played out in a series of litigations and legislative reforms, the tax
law forged ahead with its own classification of platform workers. During 2017,
two companion bills (The NEW GIG Act of 2017) were introduced in the U.S.
House108 and the Senate109 regarding worker classification for tax purposes. The
NEW GIG Act language, made it into the initial December 2017 Senate tax reform
bill but was then dropped without official comment (though there was public
commentary) before the new tax legislation was enacted.110
Touted as a “clarification” of existing worker classification rules, the bill
sought to achieve such clarification through the introduction of a safe harbor,
“which, if satisfied, would ensure that the worker (service provider) would be
treated as an independent contractor rather than an employee.”111 Under the
proposal, if three objective tests are met, the worker would be treated for tax
purposes as an independent contractor and not an employee. The first test looks
to the relationship between the parties, including factors such as the specificity
of the task, exclusivity of the relationship, and whether the service provider
incurs expenses.112 The second test turns on the location of the services and how
they are provided.113 The third test requires a written contract between the two
107 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00379-RSL Opinion (9th Cir. 2018),
available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/18181818/Opinion
%20–%20Chamber%20v.%20Seattle%20%28Ninth%20Circuit%29.pdf.
108 The New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and Growth (NEW GIG) Act of 2017,
H.R. 4165, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/4165/text.
109 The New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and Growth (NEW GIG) Act of 2017,
S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/1549/text.
110 See Oei & Ring, The Senate Tax Bill and The Battles Over Worker Classification, supra note 1.
111 Press Release, Rep. Rice Introduces NEW GIG Act to Clarify Worker Classification (Oct. 27,
2017), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20171110211736/https:/rice.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/rep-rice-introduces-new-gig-act-to-clarify-worker-classification-rules.
112 See Oei & Ring, The Senate Tax Bill and The Battles Over Worker Classification, supra note 1.
113 Id.
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parties expressly stating that the relationship is one of independent contracting
and acknowledging the obligations for taxes and reporting/withholding.114
Clearly, this safe harbor is meant to be very safe indeed (and it echoes the
tests, described above, found in certain state-level transportation network com-
pany legislation). The first two tests likely would be satisfied by most sharing
economy businesses by virtue of their basic structure. Moreover, many nonshar-
ing businesses that rely on the services of an array of “freelance” workers would
also meet the requirements. In reality, the reach of the proposal would extend
far beyond the sharing economy. The third test simply requires the parties
contractually state the conclusion of independent contractor status. Given that
this is the current state of play for most workers on sharing platforms, it proves
to be no burden at all for a business seeking to confirm tax classification of its
workers as independent contractors. The safe harbor is given further protection
from IRS scrutiny: if the parties have tried in good faith to comply with the safe
harbor, but fail, the IRS can only reclassify workers as employees (and the
payors/service recipients as employers) on a prospective basis.115
Beyond the safe harbor, the bill would revise certain third-party reporting
obligations and would have the effect of increasing the number of platform
workers subject to Form 1099-K information reporting. The one section of the
proposal that distinctly addresses tax concerns articulated by sharing-economy
workers (the burden of compliance with reporting and payment of estimated
taxes)116 is that which institutes a new withholding obligation.117 Subject to
some limits, the payor/service recipient would be required to withhold tax on
payments made to independent contractors covered by the bill.118 If instituted,
this rule would significantly reduce the administrative burden on platform
workers regarding quarterly reporting and payment of estimated taxes. It
would not, however, reduce the administrative compliance burden on these
workers in taking business deductions. Workers would still need to determine
what expenses were deductible, how to properly document these outlays, and
how to distinguish businesses from personal costs.
From a purely tax perspective, the NEW GIG Act looks like an effort to
address some of the more pressing concerns workers have regarding the
114 Id.
115 See id.; NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549.
116 See, e. g., Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1.
117 See NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549, supra note 115; Oei & Ring, The Senate Tax Bill and The
Battles Over Worker Classification, supra note 1.
118 See sources cited supra note 117.
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administrative burden of taxes,119 while retaining the independent-contractor
classification (which does have the tax advantage of giving workers greater
ability to actually deduct their costs incurred in performing their services).
What was entirely missing from the conversation surrounding the NEW GIG
Act was its intersection with the rest of the debate regarding worker classifica-
tion and the sharing economy. There seemed to be no appreciation of the
potential impact of the legislation on active debates regarding working classifi-
cation for various state and federal employment law and related purposes.
IV Intersections of Silos and First Movers
Through contract, rhetoric, litigation and legislation, the platforms and their
workers have both sought to prevail on the worker-classification question and
secure a first-mover advantage. Although the binding effect of a determination
in one forum may be somewhat limited, given the diversity of jurisdictions,
laws, businesses, and tribunals, the participants appreciate the potential
power in being the first to frame the argument and create a legal baseline.
DoorDash General Counsel Keith Yandell identified this advantage in April
2017 when he reported that the settlement just reached with workers over
classification “represent[ed] a fair compromise … and makes changes that
will further cement Dashers’ [workers’] status as independent contractors.”120
Even if such “cementing” is possible, and path dependence is established, that
is no guarantee of appropriate policy outcomes.
The critical questions at stake in the sharing economy regarding worker
classification are not susceptible to easy answers. Workers and businesses have
multiple interests across various arenas. Holding current law steady, workers
might, for example, prefer to be treated as independent contractors for some
parts of tax law, and as employees for other parts of tax law, as well as for many
119 For further discussion of the tax burdens and challenges experienced by workers in the
sharing economy, see Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
1415 (2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894394;
CAROLINE BRUCKNER, SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS
OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY (2016), available at https://www.
american.edu/kogod/research/upload/shortchanged.pdf; Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?,
supra note 1.
120 Keith Yandell, An Update on Dasher Class Action, DOORDASH (Apr. 10, 2017), available
at https://blog.doordash.com/an-update-on-dasher-class-action-6990643be500 (announcing
DoorDash’s settlement of a lawsuit regarding classification of workers for $3.5 million).
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aspects of employment, labor, and discrimination law. Strong advocacy for a
particular classification in one context might not produce a universally desired
result for workers across all legal regimes. Moreover, it is not even clear that the
debate regarding worker classification is being conducted at the appropriate
level and is asking the “right” question.
Ultimately, the most appropriate question may be why particular rights,
benefits and duties should be tied to a particular worker classification, especially
if the borderline between the two categories is sufficiently porous. That is, rather
than argue about the classification of a sharing economy worker under state
law, perhaps the better legal and policy question is why should a benefit such as
anti-discrimination protection be tied to an employee classification? There may
be solid reasons―but they should be articulable and they should be linked to
discernable distinctions between employees and independent contractors.121
Unfortunately, given that these issues are arising in the context of legal silos
with strong first-mover efforts, the legal system may find itself on the cusp of
powerful path dependence. The remaining question then is how we might
envision an improved debate over worker classification that would be likely to
generate more comprehensive, and less ad hoc, legal results. This Part first
examines the intersection of silos and first-mover effects to illustrate the poten-
tial for unintended path dependence in worker classification. Then this Part
considers ways in which legal debate can mitigate the constraining effects of
silos and first movers in an effort to develop thoughtful policy outcomes.
A Interplay of Silos and First-Mover Actions
As explored above, lawyers, regulators, policy makers and academics have areas
of expertise through which they assess and evaluate the sharing economy
worker classification debate. That is, the legal community operates in silos of
expertise. This reality affects the assessment of the underlying problem and the
kinds of outcomes that might be sought―and it impacts the range of options
that are offered, considered, and advocated. In particular, legal silos allow
unsubstantiated assumptions (implicit or explicit) about the desirability of a
legal rule to shape analysis. This silo effect, however, is compounded by strong
121 One possibility is that the reality of independent contractors has shifted over time, as
workers who historically would have been employees are now functioning as micro-business
persons without the expertise, power, and investment incentives of earlier independent con-
tractors. See, e. g., Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 1.
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first-mover actions, especially if some parties fail to appreciate the scope and
reach of the result. Two examples, drawn from Parts II and III help illustrate.
1 Litigation, Silos and First Movers
Not surprisingly, tax law is perhaps one of the legal fields most likely to
experience the silo effect. In both legal practice and academia, the boundaries
between tax and other legal fields can be quite strong with limited crossover.
This reality may help explain the focus by driver-plaintiffs in the Uber classi-
fication litigation on securing employee status. From a labor, employment,
benefits, or discrimination perspective, employee status has much to recom-
mend it. But, as detailed in Part II.B and C, the tax story is more complicated
and achieving employee classification without any corresponding change in
the underlying platform model (such as a shift to the platform bearing the
costs of driving) is not necessarily a worker-favorable tax outcome. Driver-
employees who accumulate significant nondeductible business expenses may
find themselves facing very high effective tax rates on their driving income
due to their inability to take deductions.122 Furthermore, the unavailability of
the section 199A deduction to these workers (with its corresponding reduction
in effective tax rate) would further sharpen the tax disparity between such
workers classified as employees and those classified as independent
contractors.
Importantly, though, the criticism here is not of the decision to prioritize
labor and related benefits, and thus chase employee status. Workers and
their advocates could legitimately weight the benefits of employee-status
outside of tax with the mixed benefits of employee status within tax and
conclude that they are best served by pursuing employee status through
litigation. Rather, the critique is of any failure to know that this trade-off
is taking place due to the silo effect. The discourse surrounding sharing
economy worker classification generally concentrates on labor law with the
realities of taxation both underexplored and under appreciated. The silo-
driven failure to consider tax more fully is compounded by the possibility
that a ruling or reform will add weight on the scale in favor of employee
status for other drivers, other ride-sharing businesses, and other platform
workers more generally.
122 See supra notes 38–62.
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2 Legislation, Silos and First Movers
A second example of the intersection of silos and first-mover effects can be seen
from the tax side. The proposed tax reform (the NEW GIG Act) was generally
hailed in the tax community as a positive step in alleviating the tax burdens
experienced by platform workers.123 When judged through a tax lens, this
conclusion makes sense. Legislation that requires the platform business to
handle quarterly reporting and payment of taxes would drastically reduce
worker-taxpayer compliance burdens (though still leaving platform workers
with critical compliance obligations in order to obtain appropriate business
expense deductions). But, just as a non-tax lens was myopic in the litigation
context, a tax-exclusive lens was myopic in the tax reform discussion. The tax
silo led members of the legal community to embrace proposed tax reform with-
out adequate appreciation of the impact in other fields.
Although the content of proposed tax reform would apply exclusively for tax
purposes, the first-mover effects of having a federal tax law declare covered
workers to be independent contractors could be significant. If enacted, the NEW
GIG rules would create a new baseline in at least one legal field (tax) where
sharing economy workers would be officially classified as independent contrac-
tors at the federal level. This classification would not be binding on states, nor
would it be binding at the federal level outside of tax. Nonetheless, its impact
would be powerful. Clearly, the sharing platforms saw this potential as they
were among the identified supporters of the tax reform proposal. The tax
analysts evaluating the reform from an exclusively tax perspective failed to
consider the impact outside of tax, both because of the silo effect itself, and
because of the lack of appreciation for the power of the first-mover function
here.124
The combination of silos and first movers is not limited to the sharing
economy and is not limited to tax.125 However, the intersection of these two
123 See supra Part III.D.
124 The first-mover effect can be influential not only in setting a baseline, but also in reducing
pressure for broader, more comprehensive reform and analysis. For example, if the NEW GIG
Act is viewed as alleviating the most significant tax burdens on workers, then it may be easier to
discount the need for wholesale reform because the “tax problem” has been resolved. See, e. g.,
NEW GIG Act of 2017, H.R. 4165; NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549, supra note 115.
125 Nor is this problem limited to the multiplicity of legal silos regarding the sharing economy.
Similar silo problems may emerge on a business sector basis. Thus, for example, regulators
focused on ridesharing may fail to adequately consider the relative impact of their decisions on
the taxi industry, and regulators focused on home-sharing may fail to consider the impact of
their positions on hotels and long-term rental markets. At present, evidence suggests that the
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forces have the potential to shape the future of sharing economy worker classi-
fication. To the extent the interplay of these two forces results in an overall legal
path that is not the result of informed deliberation, we risk setting a course that
does not reflect our collective best judgement.
The question, then, is how can we realistically avoid this outcome and how
can we foster a better legal and policy conversation. Part IV.B takes up this
question and identifies some of the primary goals and components of a more
robust dialogue on the treatment of workers in the sharing economy.
B Paths for Better Decision-Making
Policy makers, commentators, and advocates bear some responsibility for ensur-
ing that discussion and evaluation of policy options and proposals is undertaken
with as full an awareness of collateral effects as possible. As reflected in the
ongoing discourse about worker classification in the sharing economy, the need
for such awareness is particularly acute where many actors operate in legal silos
and active efforts are underway to lock-in specific legal outcomes. The relatively
obvious solution at this point is to heighten awareness of silo effects and to
pursue steps to counter the silo effect, especially in an active first-mover context.
Crucial steps would include the following:
1. Engagement across fields: Interdisciplinary work within law is neither novel
nor impossible. That said, in reality, the pressures of time, limited expertise,
and lack of awareness appear to drive the circumscribed analysis under-
taken on many issues. Active engagement through consultation outside
one’s field, topical conferences, and research projects that inherently unify
multiple legal conversations swirling around a basic problem, offer the
potential to reduce the number of false assumptions that underlay legal
recommendations.
2. Awareness itself: The exhortation to engage across legal fields presumes an
appreciation of the silo effect and also some level of knowledge about where
the valuable intersections lie. Thus, for example, in the worker classification
debate, it requires that analysts not only recognize the degree to which they
operate in a silo (and that unexamined assumptions about other legal fields
concerns of these nonsharing sectors have attracted attention. See, e. g., Michael Goldstein,
Dislocation and Its Discontents: Ride-Sharing’s Impact on the Taxi Industry, FORBES (June 8,
2018), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2018/06/08/uber-lyft-taxi-
drivers/#76d55bad59f0.
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pose risks), but that they realize worker classification is one of those issues
that demands study from beyond the silo.
3. Structured inquiry into collateral effects: One option for ensuring that mea-
sures to combat silos would be undertaken would be to institutionalize a
process of asking questions about notable collateral effects in the early
stages of design, drafting and analysis. This approach and commitment
could be incorporated into the work of individual scholars, legal advocates,
and legislators.
Beyond the prospect of improved decision making on worker classification
questions, these measures, when adopted in the sharing economy debates,
have the potential to foster a deeper examination of the policy issues at stake.
At a minimum, moving out of silos in a first-mover world increases the like-
lihood that we will pursue legal change based on a full appraisal of benefits and
harms. More promising, however, is the possibility of encouraging examination
of the deeper design and policy questions.
Here, in the worker classification context, the fundamental question is what
benefits, risks, and responsibilities should be tied to worker status? Again, the
question itself is not new. But the discussion within the sharing economy could
revitalize this society-wide conversation given: (1) the newness of the sector and
its relatively rapid impact on consumers/worker interactions in a variety of
commercial settings (including transportation, accommodations, household
help); (2) the rapid spread of the sector across the country, helping to make it
a national phenomenon; (3) the current success of platforms in asserting a
uniform worker classification, and using classification as part of their competi-
tive advantage over more traditionally structured operations; and (4) the expan-
sion of these issues globally, though with distinctive domestic twists. Thus, the
benefits from a revised, anti-silo approach for assessing the details of worker
classification could ultimately contribute to a more comprehensive review of the
treatment of workers in society.
Conclusion
The debates over worker classification in the sharing economy have exhibited
strong silo and first-mover effects, which in tandem threaten to undermine the
development of legal rules and policies consistent with a careful assessment of
benefits and harms. If the goal is the creation of policy based on more complete
information, we must endorse a commitment to reduce silos effects where
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possible. The primary factor in success will be acknowledgment of the role and
power of silos operating in the legal system. From there we can develop both a
broader legal foundation and a procedural framework for identifying important
collateral effects and competing goals. The result, ideally, would be the design
of rules (here, worker classification), that made sense from the combined per-
spective of tax, labor, employment and other fields of law. These rules need not
be uniform, but in their reformulation, we should be attentive to spillover effects
from decisions in one setting to another. To the extent identical classification
rules would be ill-advised, legal actors could attempt to contain the reach of
more field-specific rules through, for example, statements in the legislative
history that explicitly limit the scope of a particular classification rule.
Ultimately, the most significant benefit that may derive from a reduction in
silos and an appreciation of first-mover effects is the prospect of engaging
with the deeper policy choices that have made worker classification so
important.
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